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VITALISTIC APPROACHES
TO LIFE IN EARLY MODERN 
ENGLAND
Abstract: Vitalism has been given 
diff erent defi nitions and diverse
fi gures have been labelled as vital-
ists throughout the history of ideas.
Concentrating on the seventeenth
century, we fi nd that scholars iden-
tify as vitalists authors who endorse
notions that are in diametrical op-
position with each other. I  briefl y 
present the ideas of dualist vitalists
(Henry More, Ralph Cudworth and 
Nehemiah Grew) and monist vitalists
(Francis Glisson, Margaret Cav-
endish and Anne Conway) and the
philosophical and theological con-
siderations informing their thought.
In all these varied forms of vitalism
the identifi able common motives are
the essential irreducibility of life (re-
garded as a property of either an im-
material spirit or matter itself) and 
the universality of life (extending well 
beyond the “organic” realm of nature,
incorporating the “inorganic”).
Keywords: Anne Conway; Francis
Glisson; Henry More; Margaret 
Cavendish; Cambridge Platonism;
biology; scientifi c revolution; 
vitalism
Vitalistické přístupy k životu 
v raně novověké Anglii
Abstrakt: V dějinách idejí se vitali-
smu dostalo různých defi nic a různé 
postavy byly označeny za  vitalisty. 
Když se soustředíme na  17. století, 
zjistíme, že badatelé identifi kovali 
jako vitalisty autory, kteří zastávají 
názory, jež jsou v diametrálním pro-
tikladu. Stručně představím názory 
dualistických vitalistů (Henry More, 
Ralph Cudworth a Nehemiah Grew) 
a  monistických vitalistů (Francis 
Glisson, Margaret Cavendishová, 
Anne Conwayová), a  fi losofi cké 
a teologické uvažování, které formo-
valo jejich myšelní. Ve  všech těchto 
různých podobách vitalismu se 
nacházejí identifi kovatelné společné 
motivy: bytostná neredukovatelnost 
života (považovaná za vlastnost buď 
nehmotného ducha nebo samotného 
hmoty) a  univerzalita života (saha-
jící daleko za  „organickou“ oblast 
přírody až „anorganické“).
Klíčová slova: Anne Conway;
Francis Glisson; Henry More; 
Margaret Cavendish; cambridgeský 
platonismus; biologie; vědecká 
revoluce; vitalismus
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Th e sciences of life and the scientifi c revolution
Few scholars would argue today that there was in the early modern era 
a revolution of the life sciences comparable to that of the physical sciences. 
Regarding biology, most accounts of the scientifi c revolution mention a few 
isolated discoveries, such as William Harvey’s discovery of the circulation.1
Th e lack of a  thoroughgoing conceptual change (one of the three aspects 
of the process of the revolution, besides methodological and institutional 
change) is especially conspicuous. Th e role of the mechanical philosophy, 
the fundamental element of the revolution in the physical sciences, had let 
its impact felt early on, but its signifi cance is nevertheless rather ambiguous. 
As Richard Westfall noticed, even though mechanical philosophy invaded 
the life sciences in the form of iatromechaninsm, it proved to be irrelevant: 
it did not contribute to the better understanding of vital phenomena, neither 
did it hinder observations and experiments that had been conducted any-
way.2 Th e most remarkable achievements, those of Fernel, Vesalius, Harvey 
etc. were performed within the old Aristotelian and Hippocratic-Galenic 
framework.3
As Justin H. Smith pointed out, that biology as a  discrete domain of 
science was non-existent in the seventeenth century and that no revolution 
actually took place, does not mean that natural philosophers were not inter-
1  See for example: John HENRY, Th e Scientifi c Revolution and the Origins of Modern Science.
London: Palgrave Macmillan 2008, p. 2. Mirko Grmek argued that a real (and a fi rst) biological 
revolution took place in the seventeenth century, which he sees as the joint advancement of 
experiments, inductive methods and mechanical explanations in the period. Although with 
hindsight we can identify these developments as prerequisite for the later progress of the life 
sciences, it remains unclear in what sense did they revolutionize the science of the living in 
the seventeenth century. Mirko D. GRMEK, La première Revolution Biologique: Réfl exions
sur la Physiologie et la Médecine du XVIII Siècle. Paris: Editions Payot 1990. For a  critique 
of Grmek’s thesis see the review by Andrew PYLE, “Book Review: La première Revolution 
Biologique: Réfl exions sur la Physiologie et la Médecine du XVIII Siècle.” British Journal for the 
History of Science, vol. 24, 1991, no. 2, pp. 255‒257.
2 Richard S. WESTFALL, Th e Construction of Modern Sciences. New York: Wiley 1971, p. 104.
3 Phillip R. SLOAN, “Descartes, the Sceptics, and the Rejection of Vitalism in Seventeenth-
Century Physiology.” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 8, 1977, no. 1, p. 2 
(1‒28).
Th is study was supported within the project of Education for Competitiveness Operational 
Programme (OPVK), Research Centre for the Th eory and History of Science (Výzkumné 
centrum pro teorii a  dějiny vědy), registration no. CZ.1.07/2.3.00/20.0138, co-fi nanced by 
the European Social Fund and the state budget of the Czech Republic; and the Hungarian 
Scientifi c Research Fund (OTKA PD-105248).
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ested in the living world.4 On the contrary, huge eff orts were concentrated
on exploring the nature of life and the boundaries between the animate and 
the inanimate world. Such speculations and explorations were conducted 
in terms of metaphysics, natural philosophy, medicine (broadly conceived 
including anatomy, physiology, therapeutics and theoretical medicine), and, 
increasingly, chemistry. Th ese domains, in so far as the phenomena of life 
were concerned, constituted the sciences of life.
Georges Canguilhem pointed at one of the most conspicuous diff erences 
between the patterns of the history of the physical sciences and the life sci-
ences. As he observed, the history of biology has been displaying a dialectic 
movement between vitalism, considered to be predominant before the 
scientifi c revolution, and mechanism.5 Vitalism, this allegedly outmoded
and transcended philosophy of biology shows a remarkable endurance and 
vitality so much so that it has proven to be able to perform several resur-
gences, and to provoke attacks and refutations by mainstream reduction-
ist science as late as the twentieth century. In contrast, science got rid of 
Aristotelian physics or phlogiston theory for good and no sensible scientist 
attempted their resurrection later. Th us vitalism, having been challenged in 
its Aristotelian form, safely survived the intellectual turmoil of the scientifi c 
revolution and for certain periods it could even take the upper hand over 
mechanism.
In this paper I  focus on the second half of the seventeenth century 
when mechanical philosophy was on its way to become the mainstream 
philosophical discourse and started to invade even physiology and medi-
cine.6 I investigate the various philosophical (that is, chiefl y metaphysical or 
distinctively speculative natural philosophical) approaches to life. Although 
it is hard or even impossible to distinguish between strictly philosophical 
and scientifi c approaches to life in this period, given the confi nes of the 
present study, I restrict my focus on the views of philosophers (or, as in the 
case of Francis Glisson and Nehemiah Grew, the speculative writings of 
physicians or natural historians) and leave out the rich and infl uential tradi-
tions of medical and alchemical vitalism, which were in fact, as it should 
4 Justin E. H. SMITH, Divine Machines: Leibniz and the Sciences of Life. Princeton – Oxford:
Princeton University Press 2011, pp. 1ff . He also argues for the justifi ability of speaking about 
biology in this era despite its obvious anachronism, an opinion with which I concur.
5 Georges CANGUILHEM, “Aspects of Vitalism.” In: Th e Knowledge of Life. New York:
Fordham University Press 2008, pp. 59‒74.
6 On the rise of mechanism in the life sciences, see Th eodore BROWN, Th e Mechanical 
Philosophy and the “Animal Oeconomy”. New York: Arno Press 1981.
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be kept in mind throughout, closely bound up with the development of the 
philosophical ideas presently under discussion. Without intending to give 
a comprehensive and exhaustive account even of the thus artifi cially isolated 
philosophical approaches themselves, which would alone require at least an 
entire monograph, I set out only to identify major patterns and strategies that 
were employed to deal with the question of life without falling back upon 
Aristotelian notions and, at the same time, to avoid the scientifi c weaknesses 
and theological dangers posed by Cartesian and Hobbesian mechanism.
Th e meanings of vitalism
Th ough the notion of mechanism or mechanical philosophy is not free from 
ambiguities and complications, at least at this level of generality it seems to 
be less problematic compared with vitalism.7 In the early modern period 
a  number of natural philosophers identifi ed themselves as mechanical 
philosophers and on the level of defi nition they were more or less in agree-
ment as to what mechanical natural philosophy meant. According to Robert 
Boyle mechanical philosophy explains natural phenomena in terms of the 
“mechanical aff ections of matter” by which he means size, shape, motion 
(and rest) of the material particles.8
Th e case of vitalism is more complicated as the term did not exist in the 
period under scrutiny.9 To vitalism various meanings have been attached,
sometimes contradictory ones. Now I  don’t even attempt to enumerate 
them, nor do I come up with a solution to this semantic conundrum. So long 
as one precisely defi nes what one means by the term and uses it consistently, 
7 For the problematic nature of mechanism in modern life science, see for example Garland F. 
ALLEN, “Mechanism, Vitalism and Organicism in Late Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century 
Biology: Th e Importance of Historical Context.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological 
and Biomedical Sciences, vol. 36, 2005, no. 2, pp. 261‒283.
8 Robert BOYLE, “An Introduction to the History of Particular Qualities (1671).” In: STEWART, 
M. A. (ed.), Selected Philosophical Papers of Robert Boyle. Indianapolis – Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing Company 1991, p. 105. To these catholic aff ections of matter Boyle adds seven “not 
altogether yet almost as catholic” principles (such as position, order and texture) that yield 
eleven principles “so fruitful that from their various associations may result a much vaster 
multitude of phenomena” and qualities observable in the natural world. Ibid., p. 107.
9 Th e term “vitalism” was coined by Charles-Louis Dumas at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. See Peter Hanns REILL, “Th e Construction of the Social Sciences in Late 
Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century Germany.” In: WITTROCK, B. – HEILBRON, J. 
– MAGNUSSON, L. (eds.), Th e Rise of the Social Sciences and the Formation of Modernity.
Dordrecht: Springer 1998, p. 110, 134, note 11 (107‒140).
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discussion remains possible even between scholars employing diff erent 
defi nitions. However, as Lester King warned, labels, though useful, can be 
tyrannical if they reify into strict disjunctive oppositions where none had 
existed.10 Labelling by the term “vitalism” such diverse fi gures as Plato, Ar-
istotle, Hippocrates, Jan Baptista van Helmont, Th omas Willis, Georg Ernst 
Stahl, Paul-Joseph Barthez and Hans Driesch, as Canguilhem does, indicates 
that the term actually hides more than it reveals. However, beyond the oft en 
contested categorization of particular fi gures, scholars usually agree that 
vitalists have in common that they believe that life cannot be understand 
in terms of, or more precisely, cannot be reduced to, properties of matter. 
Accordingly, Canguilhem says that “it is nonetheless a fact that, in general 
and as a consequence of the signifi cation it acquired in the eighteenth cen-
tury, the term vitalism is appropriate for any biology careful to maintain its 
independence from the annexationist ambitions of the sciences of matter.”11
Th is independence from mere matter usually manifests itself in the 
presupposition of the existence of “something other” than matter, a  vital 
principle, an animating substance, an entelechy. Th us, vitalism is oft en 
understood as a dualistic philosophy. In later history self-conscious vitalists 
such as Barthez and Driesch, both of whom posited an autonomous vital 
agent responsible for the specifi c characteristics of living beings, substanti-
ate this claim. Similarly, Henry More the seventeenth century Cambridge 
Platonist philosopher can be designated as vitalist on account of his doctrine 
of the spirit of nature, an immaterial agent governing material nature.12
However, one does not have to dig too deeply in the relevant secondary 
literature to fi nd a  diagonally opposite interpretation. Carolyn Merchant 
identifi es the contemporary critics of early (Cartesian and Hobbesian) me-
chanical philosophy as belonging to two major camps: the Cambridge Pla-
tonists, who were dualists (though their dualism diff ered signifi cantly from 
Cartesianism), and the vitalists. In contrast to the dualism of Cambridge 
Platonism, vitalists “affi  rmed the life of all things through a reduction of the 
10 Lester KING, Th e Philosophy of Medicine: Th e Eighteenth Century. Cambridge, MA – London:
Harvard University Press 1978, p. 95. King speaks here of iatromechanism and iatrochemistry.
11  CANGUILHEM, “Aspects of Vitalism,” p. 60.
12  Henry More is called vitalist by, among others, Alexander Jacob in his edition of More’s 
Immortality of the Soul (Alexander JACOB, More’s Immortality of the Soul. Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers 1987). More and Nehemiah Grew are associated with vitalism 
by Brian Garrett, see Brian GARRETT, “Vitalism and Teleology in the Natural Philosophy of 
Nehemiah Grew (1641–1712).” British Journal for the History of Science, vol. 36, 2003, no. 1,
pp. 61‒83.
Vitalistic Approaches to Life in Early Modern England
214
Cartesian dualism to the monistic unity of matter and spirit.”13 According to 
Merchant, the proponents of vitalism include Francis Glisson, Francis Mer-
cury van Helmont, Anne Conway and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Other 
scholars studying seventeenth century thought also identify vitalism with 
a  monistic materialism. Stephen M. Fallon defi nes vitalism as “the belief 
that life is a property traceable to matter itself rather than to either the mo-
tion of complex organizations of matter or an immaterial soul,”14 and he 
includes Francis Bacon, William Harvey, Anne Conway and John Milton in 
this current of thought. Following both Merchant and Fallon, John Rogers 
also highlights the monistic aspect of vitalism, that conceives of material 
substance as a  “unity of matter and spirit” and “a  self-active entity.”15 In
Rogers’s view the “premier vitalist theorists” are Jan Baptista van Helmont 
(father of Francis Mercury), William Harvey and Francis Glisson but he 
also includes (actually his main concern are) John Milton, the Digger leader 
Gerrard Winstanley and Margaret Cavendish. Th us, in contrast to Canguil-
hem’s characterization of vitalism in the eighteenth century and beyond, at 
least some scholars see seventeenth century vitalism not as attempting to 
demarcate itself from the sciences of matter but as a science of matter itself, 
albeit a science of matter very diff erent from mechanical natural philosophy.
Th us, under the rubric of vitalism we fi nd thinkers who not only dif-
fered here and there but who espoused diametrically opposite metaphysical 
stances. Th e vitalism of Glisson, Conway and Cavendish is monistic, accord-
ing to them matter as such is active and is endowed with vital properties. Th e 
Cambridge Platonists and their followers, on the other hand, are dualists. 
According to them, matter is inert and passive, vital functions and activity 
are attributable to immaterial spiritual beings. Interestingly, they concur 
with strict mechanism in that, properly speaking, matter cannot be said 
to be alive. Th is explains Henry More’s qualifi ed enthusiasm for Cartesian 
philosophy which monistic vitalist thinkers never had the chance to elicit 
in him, even though nowadays both Cambridge Platonists and monist vi-
talists are oft en subsumed under the heading “vitalism” together.16 On the
13 Carolyn MERCHANT, “Th e Vitalism of Anne Conway: Its Impact on Leibniz’s Concept of 
the Monad.” Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 17, 1979, no. 3, p. 255 (255–269).
14  Stephen M. FALLON, Milton among the Philosophers. Ithaca – London: Cornell University 
Press 1991, p. 111.
15  John ROGERS, Th e Matter of Revolution: Science, Poetry, and Politics in the Age of Milton. 
Ithaca – London: Cornell University Press 1996. p. 10.
16 Discussing Ralph Cudworth’s True Intellectual System, John Sellars also points out that 
from the Cartesian Cudworth’s perspective, mechanical corpuscularian materialism has at 
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other hand, in the eye of More and other dualists, Cartesian mechanism 
wrongfully perverted, or Hobbesian mechanism as it is, can pose a similar 
threat to monistic vitalism. From their perspective, the suggestion that 
matter (together with the laws of nature governing it) is self-suffi  cient and 
capable of bringing about natural order (which the Cambridge Platonists 
fl atly reject) is obviously atheistic. Th e autonomy of matter undermines the 
belief in God and divine providence and destroys the moral order. Perhaps 
there is no more powerful contemporary articulation of the fears of the 
Cambridge Platonists and other critics of theories involving self-organizing 
autonomous matter than the words with which Satan justifi es his rebellion 
in Milton’s Paradise Lost. Satan rejects that he was created by God and that
he has a concomitant obligation to obey his creator. Instead, he claims that 
he and his fellow rebels emerged from unformed matter by virtue of their 
own power inherent in them as material beings: “We know no time when 
we were not as now; / Know none before us, self-begot, self-rais’d / By our 
own quick’ning pow’r [...]”.17 Th at in the philosopher-poet’s imagination the 
deadliest rebellion in history was justifi ed by the doctrine of self-organizing 
matter (leaving aside for now the moot question of Milton’s own sympathies) 
indicates the theological and moral import of this doctrine.
Dualistic vitalisms
Whereas the assertion that bodies qua bodies cannot be alive meant for 
the Cartesians the elimination of the living as a natural kind,18 it prompted
the Cambridge Platonists and their followers to introduce a universal vital 
substance that animates the world. One of the most eloquent promoters 
of the notion of the Spirit of Nature in the second half of the seventeenth 
century was the Cambridge Platonist philosopher and theologian Henry 
More (1614‒1687). Having abandoned his youthful endorsement of a kind 
of monistic philosophy in the 1640s and early 1650s, in his mature years he 
posited an intermediate agent between God and the material world, which 
he called the Spirit of Nature and defi ned thus:
least partial truth in it as a component of an incorporealist, theologically sound system. John 
SELLARS, “Is God a Mindless Vegetable? Cudworth on Stoic Th eology.” Intellectual History 
Review, vol. 21, 2011, no. 2, pp. 121–133.
17  John MILTON, Paradise Lost, Book V, 859–861.
18  Dennis DES CHENE, Spirits and Clocks: Machine and Organism in Descartes. Ithaca –
London: Cornell University Press 2001, p. 2.
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A substance incorporeal, but without Sense and Animadversion, pervading the 
whole Matter of the Universe, and exercising a Plastical power therein, according 
to the sundry predispositions and occasions in the parts it works upon, raising 
such Phaenomena in the World, by directing the parts of the Matter and their 
Motion, as cannot be resolved into mere Mechanical powers.19
Th is spirit, as spiritual substances (including animal and human souls) in 
general, is penetrable and indiscerpible (indivisible), that it, its essence is 
diametrically opposed to that of material substance which is impenetrable 
and discerpible. Th us, in sharp contrast to Cartesian metaphysics, More held 
that both matter and spirit are extended.20 More importantly to our present 
concern, he attributes life and movement to spirit alone while he categori-
cally deprives matter of them. Matter is defi ned by him as a substance “of it-
self altogether destitute of all Perception, Life, and Motion.”21 Th ese properties 
belong to spirit, which has “immediate Properties whereby it is understood 
to have Life intrinsically in itself, and the faculty of moving; which in some
sence is true in all Spirits whatsoever, forasmuch as Life is either Vegetative,
Sensitive, or Intellectual.”22 As Jasper Reid has pointed out, “from More’s
point of view, to have the power to animate a body was just what it was to 
be a spirit. Hence, there was no more need for More to explain how a soul 
could act on matter than there was for Descartes to explain how a soul could 
think.”23 In other words, the phenomenon of life, being an inherent irreduc-
ible property of spirit, does not require further explication.24
19  Henry MORE, Th e Immortality of the Soul. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers 1987
[1659], Book III. Chapter 12, §1, p. 254 (italics in the original).
20  More called nullibism the view according to which spiritual substances are not extended, 
thus they are nowhere in space, and he exerted considerable eff ort to refute it. See More’s 
Th e easie, true, and genuine Notion, and a  Consistent Explication of the Nature of a  Spirit,
printed in Joseph GLANVIL, Saducismus Triumphatus. London: James Collins 1681, 99‒180. 
He readily endorsed the consequence that God is also extended, although he insisted that 
God, just like spirits in general, is strictly immaterial. Yet on account of his insistence on 
the spirits’ extension and also its “spissitude” (its ability to dilate and contract), there are 
traces of a paradoxical quasi-materialism in More’s writings, pointed out by John Henry; see
John HENRY, “A Cambridge Platonist’s Materialism: Henry More and the Concept of Soul.” 
Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institute, vol. 49, 1986, pp. 172‒195.
21  MORE, Th e easie, true, and genuine Notion, and a Consistent Explication of the Nature of 
a Spirit, p. 140.
22 Ibid., p. 144 (italics in the original).
23  Jasper REID, Th e Metaphysics of Henry More. Dordrecht: Springer 2012, pp. 239‒240.
24  More at fi rst introduced a host of diff erent, individual spiritual substances that animate plants, 
animals, human beings and also intervene in the physical process where mechanical operations 
prove insuffi  cient. Later, with the introduction of a single all-pervading spiritual substance he 
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What called for explanation, as it is usual in dualist systems, was the 
interaction between the corporeal and the material substance. At this point 
More introduced the notion of vital congruity:
It is plain therefore, that this Union of the Soul with Matter does not arise from
any such gross Mechanical way, as when two Bodies stick one in another by 
reason of any toughness and viscosity, or streight commissure of parts; but from 
a congruity of another nature, which I know not better how to term then Vital: 
which Vital Congruity is chiefl y in the Soul it self, it being the noblest Principle 
of Life; but is also in the Matter, and is there nothing but such modifi cation 
thereof as fi ts the Plastick part of the Soul, and tempts out that Faculty into 
act. Not that there is any Life in the Matter with which this in the Soul should 
sympathize and unite; but it is termed Vital because it makes the Matter a con-
gruous Subject for the Soul to reside in, and exercise the functions of life. For
that which has no life it self, may tie to it that which has.25
Th us, according to More, soul is able to prepare matter suitable to its own 
residence therein. As it might be suspected (and we shall see it in the exam-
ple of Anne Conway), monistic vitalists found this account of the interaction 
between two substances wanting, to say the least.
During his intellectual development, More became increasingly restrictive 
as to the scope of mechanical explanations of physical phenomena. He pointed 
out many times that a number of physical phenomena are inexplicable in mech-
anistic terms and by the late 1660s he came to the conclusion that “there is no 
purely Mechanicall Phenomenon in the whole Universe.”26 In his correspond-
ence with Henry Hyrne, he made clear what he meant by “pure mechanism”:
supposing so much motion in the World as there is, the mere rumblement of ye
matter with this motion will generate all ye corporeall Phaenomena in ye world,”
stating that this view tends to “Atheisme” as it might imply that “that ye world
generated it self.27
reduced the number of entities while at the same time extended the sphere of spiritual agency 
to the whole of nature. Th e Spirit of Nature by itself accounted for plant growth and also many 
physical processes, while only animal and human souls retained their individuality.
25  MORE, Th e Immortality of the Soul, Book 2, Chapter 14, §§8–9, p. 158 (italics in the original).
26  Henry MORE, Divine Dialogues, vol. 1, 1668, as cited in Alan GABBEY, “Henry More and
the Limits of Mechanism.” In: HUTTON, S. (ed.), Henry More (1614‒1687): Tercentenary 
Studies. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1990, p. 25 (18‒35).
27  As cited in GABBEY, “Henry More and the Limits to Mechanism,” pp. 26‒27. Here More 
identifi es himself with the view he calls “mixt Mechanicall Philosophy.”
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Yet as we shall see, according to More hylozoic or monistic vitalism poses as 
great (if not even greater) threat to true religion as strict mechanism. As he 
put it referring to Francis Glisson (to whom I shall return below), „for that 
Hypothesis, if it were true, were as safe, if not a safer Refuge for Atheists, 
then mere Mechanick Philosophie is.”28 For More only the continual super-
vision of an all-pervading, animating but unconscious spiritual substance, 
this blind executioner of the divine ordinances, can guarantee the mainte-
nance of order and harmony in the universe that, by virtue of this universal 
spiritual substance, itself obtains the character of a  living being, like “one 
large Zoophyton or a Plant-Animal.”29
In the natural philosophy of an eminent follower of the Cambridge Pla-
tonists, the botanist Nehemiah Grew (1641‒1712) the idea that matter cannot 
be subject of life is even more emphatic. Grew says, “we must allow the being 
of a Substantial Principle, distinct from Body, as the proper and immediate 
Subject of Life.”30 As “Body cannot be vital,” the existence of a vital substance, 
distinct from the corporeal substance, is necessary. Grew writes, “without 
a  Substantial Principle, as the proper Subject of Life, distinct from Body: 
Th ere could be no Living, much less any Sensible, Th inking, or Reasonable 
Th ing.”31 He demonstrates this claim by refuting one by one each item on
a supposedly exhaustive list containing the attempts to derive life directly 
from matter. He suggests four possibilities for how life could theoretically 
be attributed to the corporeal substance: matter is either regarded as “Subti-
lized, or as Organized, or as moved, or as Endowed with Life.”32
 Grew ascribes the view that animal life consists in subtle, ethereal mat-
ter to Descartes and Th omas Willis.33 Grew argues that by merely increasing 
28 Henry MORE, Annotations upon the Discourse of Truth. In: Joseph GLANVIL – George 
RUST, Two Choice and Useful Treatises. London: James Collins and Sam Lowndes 1682,
p. 192‒193, as cited in HENRY, “Medicine and Pneumatology,” 38‒39.
29  MORE, Annotations upon the Discourse of Truth, p. 244, as cited in REID, Th e Metaphysics
of Henry More, p. 343.
30  Nehemiah GREW, Cosmologia Sacra, or a Discourse of the Universe as it is the Creature and 
Kingdom of God. London: W. Rogers, S. Smith and B. Walford 1701, p. 34.
31 Ibid., 32.
32 Ibid. 
33  It is interesting to note that Willis, considered a vitalist by Canguilhem, is associated to 
Descartes, the arch-mechanist by a near-contemporary of both. John Ray, the natural historian 
and physico-theologist, himself a supporter of Cudworth’s plastick nature, also lumps Willis 
together with Descartes and Gassendi as those who taught that animals are “mere machines.” 
John RAY, Th e Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of the Creation. London: William
Innys 1714, p. 54. (Th e book was fi rst published in 1692.)
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the subtlety of material substance life cannot emerge, because subtilization 
is nothing more than division, and the division of dead matter will always 
result in dead matter. Moreover, subtlety allows for degrees which would 
entail that life is also a matter of degree, and we should suppose that drops of 
mist or a heap of sand have more or less life in them. Similar line of reason-
ing applies for organization and movement: being diff erently sized, fi gured, 
mixed, or moved cannot bring about the qualitatively diff erent property of 
life, and these views would also imply that every corporeal thing, in so far as 
they are fi gured or moved etc., should have more or less life in them, which 
is obviously absurd.34 Neither can matter be productive or receptive of life. It
cannot be productive of life because it even cannot be productive of motion 
(which Grew demonstrated in an earlier chapter). Body can be receptive of 
motion (from God), but not of life, otherwise every atom could be living in 
the same manner as every atom can be moving. Grew thus concludes that
[t]o avoid which Absurdity, we must allow the being of a Substantial Principle, 
distinct from Body, as the proper and immediate Subject of Life. Or, that as 
Body, is the proper and immediate Subject; of any Species of Motion: So there 
ought to be such a Substantial Principle, as may be the proper and immediate 
Subject, not of one only, but of any Species of Life. What therefore Motion is, to 
all Bodies; that Life is, suo modo, to all the Species of Vital Substance.35
Grew, again, felt that life is an essentially irreducible property of this sub-
stance so that it cannot (and need not) be further analyzed.
According to Ralph Cudworth (1617‒1688), the most prominent Cam-
bridge Platonist besides More, atheists are always materialists (or corporeal-
ist, as he calls them), whereas incorporealists (those who accept the exist-
ence of incorporeal substances) are never atheists.36 Th us, one who intends 
to refute atheism, and this was Cudworth’s objective in his True Intellectual 
System of the Universe (1678), has to refute materialism and demonstrate
the existence of incorporeal substances. Cudworth fi rst identifi es four types 
of atheistic philosophies, all of which are rooted in antiquity: Anaximan-
drian or hylopathic, Democritical or atomostic, Stoic or cosmoplastic, and 
Stratonian ot hylozoic.37 Th e fi rst two types hold that matter is “dead and
34 Ibid., p. 33.
35 Ibid., p. 34.
36 Cudworth allows that corporealists are not necessarily atheists but he deems their conception 
of a corporeal and anthropomorphic deity childish. Ralph CUDWORTH, Th e True Intellectual 
System of the Universe. Vol. 1. London: Th omas Tegg 1845, Chapter 3, § 30, p. 202.
37 Ibid., pp. 199–200.
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stupid,” the third type regards matter “plastic” but “senseless,” while hylozo-
ism “attributes to all matter, as such, a certain living and energetic nature, 
but devoid of animality, sense and consciousness.”38 Although this life that 
hlyozoists wish to attribute to matter is only “natural” and “plastic,” matter 
is claimed to able to organize itself into higher levels of complexity and thus 
to perform higher functions (such as sense and cognition):
All parts of matter being supposed able to form themselves artifi cially and 
methodically (though without any deliberation or attentive consideration) to 
the greatest advantage of their present respective capabilities, and therefore also 
sometimes by organization to improve themselves further into sense and self-
enjoyment in all animals, as also to universal reason and refl exive knowledge in 
men; it is plain, that there is no necessity at all left , either of any incorporeal soul 
in men to make them rational, or of any Deity in the whole universe to solve the 
regularity thereof.39
In the Preface Cudworth remarks that hylozoism, originally an ancient 
doctrine, had been lying dormant until recently, when it was “awakened” 
and “revived” by some
who were so sagacious as plainly to perceive that the atomic form could never 
do their business, nor prove defensible, and therefore to carry on this attempt to 
carry on this cause of atheism, in quite a diff erent way, by the life and perception 
of matter, and also that this, in all probability, would ere long publicly appear 
upon the stage, though not barefaced, but in disguise.40
Th is is probably a reference to Francis Glisson’s Latin treatise On the Ener-
getic Nature of Substance published in 1672.41
Monistic vitalisms
Th e Cambridge physician Francis Glisson’s (1597–1677) hylozoic material-
ism, also called energetic corpuscularianism, conceives of matter as a sub-
stance endowed with energy, perception and appetite.42 Matter is not an
38 Ibid., p. 200.
39 Ibid., p. 144.
40 Ibid., p. xl. 
41  Francis GLISSON, De Natura Substantiae Energetica. London: E. Flesher 1672.
42  For the subtleties of Glisson’s theory, see Guido GIGLIONI, “Francis Glisson’s Notion of 
Confoederatio Naturae in the Context of Hylozoistic Corpuscularianism.” Revue d’histoire des 
sciences, vol. 55, 2002, no. 2, pp. 239–262.
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aggregate of individual, active corpuscules or minima naturalia, but on the
contrary, the disposition of the particles (which are to be conceived as clots 
of energy) are derivative of the general energetic nature of the material sub-
stance, and even the identity of the minima depends on their broader mate-
rial context.43 Natural things as individuals come into existence by a process 
of self-confederation during which particles perceived as immanent are 
incorporated while the rest is expelled. Self-confederation is an internally 
driven, perceptive and constitutive process. Matter can be organized into 
diff erent levels of complexity, but as Guido Giglioni points out, although 
Glisson makes a  distinction between “inorganic” (similaris) and “organ-
ized” (dissimilaris) matter, yet “natural perception – the source of all life and 
irritability in the body – is intrinsic in matter qua matter independently of 
its level of organization.”44 Glisson’s abstruse theory of energetic substance
owes much to Tommaso Campanella and Jan Baptista van Helmont and is 
a  late heir of Renaissance forms of pansensism.45 Yet Glisson’s theory was
also inspired by empirical fi ndings and physiological research. In fact, Glis-
son is credited with the discovery of living tissues’ irritability, their capacity 
to respond to external stimuli without the mediation of the nervous system.46
As he saw it, his natural philosophy could shed more light on his medical 
and physiological views, so much so that that he postponed the publication 
of his treatise on the motion of the intestines including his explication of 
irritability, until he devised his unique and original natural philosophy.
Although Glisson’s idiosyncratic theory was not easily accessible even to 
the contemporaries due to its unusual ideas and highly technical language, it 
43  As Giglioni explains, “the smallest corpuscles resulting from a division could not be the 
same in a diff erent division of the same compound: this is because the minima naturalia are 
not atoms, that is, discrete entities which are defi nite once and for all, nor are they particles 
which are obtained by dividing a compound into its possible smallest terms from the outside. 
Rather, they are so to speak temporary clots of vital energy, which shun further divisions since 
they perceive this as a danger for their identity.” Ibid., p. 252.
44  See Guido GIGLIONI, “Whatever Happened to Francis Glisson?” Albrecht Haller and the 
Fate of Eighteenth-Century Irritability.” Science in Context, vol. 21, 2008, no. 4, pp. 1–29.
45 GIGLIONI, “Francis Glisson’s Notion of Confoederatio Naturae,” p. 241.
46  See GIGLIONI, “Whatever Happened to Francis Glisson?” and John HENRY, “Medicine 
and Pneumatology: Richard Baxter, Henry More, and Francis Glisson’s Treatise on the
Energetic Nature of Substance.” Medical History, vol. 31, 1987, no. 1, pp. 15‒40. On page 22,
Henry refers to Glisson’s philosophy as materialistic vitalism. Walter Pagel traces Glisson’s 
notion of irritability to Jan Baptista van Helmont and William Harvey, the latter of whom 
attributed to blood an intrinsic tendency to movement. See Walter PAGEL, Joan Baptista Van
Helmont: Reformer of Science and Medicine. Cambridge – New York: Cambridge University 
Press 1982, pp. 120–123.
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found some sympathizers even outside the medical community. Th e Puritan 
theologian Richard Baxter (1615–1691) wrote commendably on Glisson’s 
theory of the energetic nature of substance in the early 1680s, inducing 
Henry More’s criticism, who in 1679 already had written a refutation of the 
physician’s philosophy.47 Th e details of the Baxter‒More debate need not con-
cern us here. Suffi  ce it to say that the fundamental disagreement between the 
two men was of theological nature. Baxter endorsed a voluntaristic theology 
with an all-powerful God who was certainly able to attach vital properties to 
matter at will. As Baxter put it,
I confess I am too dull to be sure that God cannot endue matter itself with the 
formal virtue of Perception: Th at you say the Cartesians hold the contrary, and 
that your writings prove it, certifi eth me not. [...] Th at Almighty God cannot 
make perceptive living Matter, and that by informing it without Mixture, I can-
not prove, or I think you: Where is the Contradiction that makes it impossible?48
On the other hand, More, the life-long defender of rational theology tried to 
secure the neat conceptual and metaphysical distinction between matter and 
spirit with all his intellectual prowess, in order to refute materialism, which 
he, like his colleague Cudworth, regarded as the chief source of atheism.49
To his chagrin, not all of his contemporaries did share his concerns, and 
the voluntarist theological stance enabled even grosser speculations. What 
if matter is not only capable of life but also of thought? Th e famous thought 
experiment was proposed in the fourth book of John Locke’s Essay Con-
cerning Human Understanding.50 But even before that, a  similar (but even 
bolder) notion had been put forward as one of the cornerstones of Margaret 
Cavendish’s natural philosophy.
Margaret Cavendish (1623–1673), the eccentric wife of William Caven-
dish, the Duke of Newcastle, was one of the most thorough-going materialists 
of the seventeenth-century, surpassed perhaps only by Th omas Hobbes, who 
came to the conclusion that even God is corporeal. Cavendish maintains 
47  More’s treatise against Glisson and Spinoza was published in 1679, titled Ad V.C. epistola
altera in Opera Omnia, his collected works in Latin translation. Th e treatise and the debate
with Baxter are discussed in HENRY, “Medicine and Pneumatology.”
48  As cited in HENRY, “Medicine and Pneumatology,” p. 36.
49  As More famously declared in the last sentence of his An Antidote Against Atheism: “No
Spirit, no God” (Henry MORE, An Antidote Against Atheism. 2nd edition. London: J. Flesher 
1655, p. 278).
50  On Locke’s idea and its subsequent history, see John W. YOLTON, Th inking Matter:
Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1983.
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that God is immaterial and omnipotent but he is infi nitely beyond nature. 
His existence is known by all creatures but his attributes are incomprehensi-
ble to them.51 Apart from God, everything is material.
In her fi rst published writing, Poems and Fancies (1653) partly written 
in verse form, Cavendish expounded an atomist natural philosophy. Atoms 
moving in space make up the world by themselves:
Small Atomes of themselves a World may make,
As being subtle, and of every shape;
And as they dance about, they places fi nde,
Such Formes as best agree, make every kind.52
But not only physical objects, but also vital and mental phenomena are pro-
duced by atoms:
Th us Life and Death, and young and old,
Are, as the several Atomes hold.
So wit, and Understanding in the Braine,
Are as the several Atomes reigne:
And Dispositions good, or ill,
Are as the several Atomes still.
And every Passion which doth rise
Is as the several Atomes lies [sic!].53
Th e construction of the world by the atoms is a spontaneous process which 
unfolds without the supervision of any external governing principle. We 
do not learn much about how the construction of the physical world actually 
takes place, but Cavendish hints at a  possible mechanism which includes 
a  “natural selection” of fi t atoms, that is, of particles with fi tting size and 
shape.
For when we build of Brick or Stone,
We lay them even, every one by one:
And when we fi nde a gap that’s big, or small,
We seek out stones to fi t that place whitall. [...]
For when not fi t, too big, or little be,
51  Margaret CAVENDISH, Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy. Ed. Eileen O’Neill. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001, p. 38.
52 Margaret CAVENDISH, Poems and Fanices. London: s.n. 1653, p. 5.
53 Ibid., p. 16.
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Th ey [the atoms] fall away, and cannot stay, we see [...]
Th us by their severall Motions, and their Formes,
As severall work-men serve each others turnes,
And thus, by chance, may a New World create [...]54
Cavendish, however, experimented with diff erent sorts of materialism 
at the same time because in the same year she published another work, 
Philosophical Fanices (1653) which already contained the elements of her
vitalistic materialism that she would elaborate in the following years. Her 
fi nal endorsement of vitalism at the expense of mechanistic atomism is not 
unrelated to her dissatisfaction with the explanation how “wandering and 
straggling” atoms moving independently in space are able to bring forth 
an apparently ordered universe. As she remarks in her Observations Upon 
Experimental Philosophy (1666),
[n]either would [nature] be able to rule those wandering and straggling atoms, 
because they are not parts of her body, but each is a single body by itself, having 
no dependence upon each other. If there should be a composition of atoms, it 
would not be a body made of parts, but of so many entire single bodies, meeting 
together as a swarm of bees.55
Independent atoms are only able to compose heaps of atoms, because they 
necessarily retain their individuality. Cavendish realizes that in her house-
building metaphor is inappropriate so long as the roles of the designer, the 
bricklayers and the bricks are all on the same level:
in the exstruction of a  house there is fi rst required an architect or surveyor, 
who orders and designs a  building, and puts the labourers to work; next the 
labourers or workmen themselves, and lastly the materials of which the house 
is built.56
Th ese roles are assigned to the rational, sensitive and inanimate matter, 
respectively. Every portion of matter, however small, is composed of these 
three sorts of elements: “there is such a commixture of animate and inani-
mate matter, that no particle in nature can be conceived or imagined, which 
is not composed of animate matter, as well as of inanimate.”57 Rational mat-
54 Ibid., pp. 5–6.
55  CAVENDISH, Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, p. 129.
56 Ibid., p. 24.
57 Ibid., p. 158.
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ter and sensitive matter are animate, that is, they are active and capable of 
self-movement. Inanimate matter is not self-moving, but it also has life and 
knowledge. Th us for Cavendish life is just as an essential and irreducible 
property of matter as for Glisson. But according to Cavendish, matter is 
also inherently cogitative and this seems to be a more fundamental prop-
erty of matter than life. For Cavendish, cognition is the most fundamental 
manifestation of life. On this account one may say that Cavendish promotes 
a panpsychist form of vitalism.58
As to what she meant by the life of matter is not altogether clear. In her 
Grounds of Natural Philosophy (1668) she says that “all the Parts of Nature 
have Life and Knowledg; but, all the Parts have not Active Life and perceptive 
Knowledg, but onely the Rational and the Sensitive.”59 Life cannot be identi-
cal with self-movement because inanimate matter, by defi nition, is incapable 
of movement by itself yet it is said to be alive no less than the animate parts. 
Cavendish oft en and unanimously declares that even the inanimate matter 
has life, although at one place she attributes life specifi cally to the sensitive 
part.60 It clear that it is on account of self-knowledge and self-sensibility that 
she attributes life to inanimate matter: “the inanimate part of matter may 
have life, according as it hath sense and knowledge; but not such a life as the 
animate part of matter has, that is, an active life”61 – that kind of life is de-
pendent on self-motion. Perhaps today we would say that inanimate matter 
is self-conscious and has knowledge of its own internal state, though it lacks 
knowledge of its external environment and the capability to organize itself.
Cavendish famously banished immaterial substance from nature and 
thus from natural philosophy:
Nature is purely corporeal or material, and there is nothing that belongs to, 
or is a part of nature, which is not corporeal; so that natural and material, or 
corporeal, are one and the same; and therefore spiritual beings, non-beings, 
58  In one clear formulation of this view Cavendish writes “I believe there is sense and reason, or 
sensitive and rational knowledge, not only in all creatures, but in every part of every particular 
creature.” Ibid., p. 151.
59  Margaret CAVENDISH, Th e Grounds of Natural Philosophy. London: A. Maxwell 1668, p. 6.
60  In her novel Th e Blazing World, Cavendish writes: “Th e sensitive [matter] is the life, the 
rational the soul, and the inanimate part, the body of infi nite nature.” Margaret CAVENDISH, 
“Th e Blazing World.” In: Political Writings. Ed. Susan James. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2001, p. 63 (1‒109).
61  CAVENDISH, Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, p. 157.
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mixt-beings, and whatsoever distinctions the learned do  make, are no ways 
belonging to nature.62
In her fi ction she treated the subject with more liberty and aff orded her-
self the boldness to turn the venerable concept of immaterial spirits on its 
head and ridicule it. In her philosophical novel, Th e Blazing World she says
of immaterial spirits, or more precisely, the immaterial spirits themselves 
confess to the protagonist, the Empress, that “natural material bodies give 
spirits motion; for we spirits, being incorporeal, have no motion but from 
our corporeal vehicles so that we move by the help of our bodies, and not the 
bodies by the help of us.”63 We also learn about them that “soul has motion 
from the body, as the moon has light from the sun.”64 Cavendish’s immate-
rial spirits are so far from being animating principles that they themselves 
are dependent on matter for their movement. But this is no wonder, because 
they have “a great affi  nity with non-beings.”65 For Cavendish, the only suit-
able place for immaterial spirits was her “work of fancy,” not her “serious 
philosophical contemplations.”66
 Cavendish was not the only female philosopher who found immaterial 
spirits unappealing and opted for a monistic vitalism. Lady Anne Conway 
(1631–1679), the bright private pupil of Henry More and his life-long friend, 
also found spirits ill-equipped to fulfi l the role her mentor would have as-
signed to them.67 According to her, the penetrable immaterial substance is 
as ineff ective in moving the body as the wind to move a ship equipped with 
a net-like sail: due to their penetrability spirits would slip through the body 
without any resistance and thus without power. Conway criticized the vital 
congruity or affi  nity of body and spirit, complaining that if body is totally 
inanimate and spirit is animated, there cannot be real congruity between 
them, nor is it clear why would active, self-moving spirits need corporeal 
62 Ibid., p. 137.
63  CAVENDISH, “Th e Blazing World,” p. 55.
64 Ibid., p. 63.
65 Ibid., p. 38.
66 Ibid., p. 5.
67  On Cavendish and Conway, see Sarah HUTTON, “Anne Conway, Margaret Cavendish, and 
Seventeenth-Century Scientifi c Th ought.” In: HUNTER, L. – HUTTON, S. (eds.): Women,
Science and Medicine 1500‒1700. Mothers and Sisters of the Royal Society. Stroud: Allan Sutton 
1997, pp. 218–234. Henry More and Conway’s remarkable friendship lasted until her untimely 
death despite their diverging philosophical views and her conversion to Quakerism.
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structures to perform their operations.68 Her own solution was that spirit
and body were substantially the same aft er all:
Truly, every body is a spirit and it diff ers from a spirit only insofar as it is darker. 
Th erefore the crasser it becomes, the more it is removed from the condition of 
spirit. Consequently, the diff erence is only modal and incremental, not essential 
and substantial.69
And again, “spirit and body are of one original nature and substance, and 
that body is nothing but fi xed and condensed spirit, and spirit nothing but 
volatile body or body made subtle.”70 Conway here seems to ascribe the 
functions traditionally attributed to immaterial substances to subtilized 
matter, which (as we have already seen) will be around the end of the century 
criticized by Grew and associated by him to Descartes and Willis. Conway, 
for her part, foresaw possible accusations of Cartesianism and declared that 
her doctrine is “so far from being Cartesianism in a new guise that it can 
more truly be called anti-Cartesianism.”71 Indeed, while (in a manner not
unlike More) she acknowledged that Descartes ingeniously accounted for 
some mechanical processes, she hastened to add that in nature
there are many operations that are far more than merely mechanical. Nature is 
not simply an organic body like a clock, which has no vital principle of motion 
in it; but it is a living body which has life and perception, which are much more 
exalted than a mere mechanism or mechanical motion.72
Conway complains that Hobbes and Descartes did not go “beyond the husk 
and shell.”73 According to her, there are much more exalted attributes of 
the extended spiritual-material substance among which she includes “life,” 
and “the capacity for every kind of feeling and perception, or knowledge, 
even love, all power and virtue, joy and fruition, which the noblest creatures 
68  Anne CONWAY, Th e Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1996, pp. 56ff . Th is book, Conway’s only known work, was 
published posthumously in 1690 in Latin translation. Conway’s original English text no longer 
exists.
69 Ibid., pp. 39–40.
70 Ibid., p. 61.
71 Ibid., p. 64.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., p. 66.
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have or can have, even the vilest and most contemptible.”74 Th us Conway’s 
universe was just as replete with, or full of, life as that of More. Both of them 
regarded substances as extended, and More’s characterization of spirit oft en 
bordered on materialism. Indeed, as Sarah Hutton interprets the disciple’s 
attitude towards her master’s teaching, the arguments raised by Conway 
against More “are directed chiefl y at his attempt to superimpose dualism 
on to his well-founded monistic intuition that body and spirit are both res 
extensae (extended things).”75
However, Conway could have been inspired by her mentor by an even 
more direct way. As I have mentioned above, early in his career, in his Pla-
tonic poems More endorsed a specifi c Neo-Platonism, in which the diff erent 
ontological levels emanate from God but in a  sense they share essential 
properties with him. Th is fundamentally divine origin manifests itself in 
the fact that even matter possesses remnants of the vital life of God: “I nere 
ment / to grant that there is any such thing existent / as a mere body: For 
all’s life, all spright.”76 Th e ultimate particles of matter, at the very base of 
the ontological ladder are still vital in a  sense, albeit devoid of formative, 
perceptive or cognitive power. As he explicated in his prose commentary on 
his poems:
Th ese be an infi nite number of vitall Atoms that may be wakened into divers 
tinctures, or energies, into Fiery, Watery, Earthy, &c. [...] Th ese be the last pro-
jections of life from the soul of the world; and are act or form though debil or 
indiff erent; like that which they call the fi rst matter. But they are not merely 
passive, but meet their information half way, as I may so speak. [...] Th ese be 
the reall matter of which all supposed bodies are compounded, and this matter 
(as I said) is form and life, so that all is life and form what ever is in the world.77
As Jasper Reid explains, in More’s system based on divine emanation
“nothing could be utterly unlike its source.”78 A  totally inert and passive 
74 Ibid. Th ese remarks gain their true signifi cance in the full context of the Christian-
Kabbalistic soteriology of Conway’s system.
75 Sarah HUTTON, Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2004, p. 89.
76  Henry MORE, Th e Complete Poems of Dr. Henry More. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press 1878, p. 114.
77 Ibid., p. 160.
78  REID, Th e Metaphysics of Henry More, p. 245. In his famous correspondence with Descartes 
at the end of the 1640s, More describes matter in the same vein: “And, in fact, all that is called
‘body’ is really a stupefi ed and sottish life, inasmuch as, though it has neither sensation nor 
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matter would be, however, really utterly diff erent from God. Interestingly,
decades later Conway would argue along similar lines: she rejects the notion 
of a  totally inert matter on the account that it does not share anything in 
common with God: “Since dead matter does not share any of the commu-
nicable attributes of God, one must then to conclude that dead matter is 
a non-being, a vain fi ction and a Chimera, and an impossible thing.”79 Th us 
More’s youthful notion of active matter came back to haunt him in his old 
day in the shape of his favourite disciple’s philosophy. It might have been 
for him intellectually and personally disturbing, but to posterity it points 
to an important lesson: that the boundary between inert matter and active 
matter, a thoroughgoing materialism and spiritualism which for More and 
his kin made all the diff erence between true religion and atheism, between 
a  divinely ordered providential universe and a  chaotic rambling of mate-
rial particles, was much more precarious and uncertain than they sought to 
present it to their audiences with all their eloquence and intellectual eff ort.
Conclusion
Th e fate and fortune of vitalism waxed and waned aft er the seventeenth-
century, but the kind of universal or cosmic vitalism was henceforward 
clearly on the decline. Ku-Ming Chang argues that at the turn of the century 
Georg Ernst Stahl “articulated a vitalism of a new age,” and that aft er him 
“vitalists never reclaimed the inorganic world as their territory” and vital-
ism was thereaft er “confi ned to the life sciences.”80 Although Stahl was in 
dialogue and in opposition fi rst and foremost with the alchemical and medi-
cal vitalism that remained outside the scope of the present study, and to the 
decline of the types vitalism I discussed contributed diff erent factors as well 
(such as the Lockean scepticism concerning the real essence of substances 
and the epistemological turn of philosophy), it is still important to note that 
at this point the science of matter and the science of life parted ways. As 
Canguilhem declared, the “the philosophically inexcusable fault” of (classi-
cal) vitalism lies in its restraint from the incorporation of the whole realm of 
nature. At least mechanists were honest imperialists who invaded both the 
inorganic and the organic world. According to Canguilhem,
animadversion, it constitutes the last and faintest shadow and image of the divine essence, 
which I take to be the most perfect life.” As cited in ibid., p. 247.
79  CONWAY, Th e Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, p. 46.
80 Ku-Ming Kevin CHANG, “Reconsidering the Place of Vitalism in Early Modern Chymistry.” 
Isis, vol. 102, 2011, no. 2, pp. 327–328 (322–329).
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[t]here can be only one philosophy of empire, that which refuses any division: 
imperialism. Th e imperialism of [mechanist] physicists or chemists is thus 
perfectly logical, pushing to its limit the expansion of logic or the logic of ex-
pansion. One cannot defend the originality of the biological phenomenon, and 
consequently the originality of biology, by demarcating within the physico-che-
mical territory ‒ that is, within the milieu of inertia, of externally determined 
movements ‒ enclaves of indetermination, zones of dissidence, or foyers of 
heresy. If one is to assert the originality of the biological, this must be in terms 
of the originality of one realm over the whole of experience, and not over islets 
of experience. In the end, classical vitalism sins, paradoxically, only in its ex-
cessive modesty, in its reluctance to universalize its conception of experience.81
Following this line of argument we might conclude that the vitalisms of 
More, Glisson, Cavendish and Conway, together with other (including 
chymical and medical) “imperialists,” represent vitalism’s pristine, or if you 
will, pre-lapsarian state.
81 CANGUILHEM, “Aspects of Vitalism,” p. 70.
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